HP and Kerberos

Kerberos case studies: from large to small (or even none)

> Jakub Urbanec HP Czech republic

Why me?

Great guys in HP Czech (believe it or not)

- Detailed, topical, in czech
- In English by me

HP

- Printers
- Hardware

PC

Servers

Big servers, storage, network equipment ...

- Software
 - Consulting and Support
 - Security
 - My managers manager
 - My manager
 - me

Use cases

- You have been through UC million times
- We can not reveal the customer names :-(

Customer 1 - pharmacy needed JUST central auth service

- Linux (RHEL, directory server)
- MIT Krb code compiled from source
- No patches, no X-realm auth
- Anything interesting?
- Boring (but still it is business ;-)!


Customer 2 big telco - central auth for services


- Solaris, HP-UX, Linux
- MIT Krb code 1.2.x era + delta level replication patch (HPUX 11.11)
- X-realm with Microsoft AD for users
- Anything interesting?
 - At least the patches and X-realm

Customer3 – large 3letter logistic organization

- 800+ servers
 - HPUX (IA, PA-RISC)
 - Linux (RHEL v 3,4,5)
- Project to enable unified access control and accounting for admin users
- AAA solution

UC 3 II





MIT Kerberos

- Standard Kerberos clients
- Standard Kerberos server
- Custom build of MIT Kerberos utilities and libraries used by custom AAA components

OpenSSH

- Standard SSH client (HP rebuild)
- Support of customer required Kerberos encryption types back-ported to RHEL3

LDAP

- RHEL Directory Server
- Custom schema added
- LDAP-UX client used for Access ctrl
- OpenLDAP libraries with TLS support used in cust. AAA components

Custom AAA components

- Audit server
- Shspy
- PAM modules
- Areader/Aserver
- Get-access-files
- Admin server GUI
- Automatic Principal Lockout

UC 3: Authentication – Kerberos

Single Sign On available to users authenticated on host

Support of customer required AES 256 required own HP-UX library build

Proper time synchronization is required

Principal Management available via kadmin utility or via custom administration GUI

Principals may be administratively locked etc.

Custom automatic principal lockout script added

UC 3: Authorization

Utilizes Standard features of NSSWITCH for LDAP

Suite of PAM modules

PAM Kerberos (custom build for HP-UX required)

PAM XXX (based on pam access driven by local XXX_access.conf file, KRB or localy)


PAM Exec (custom built for HP-UX required)

PAM Env (custom build for HP-UX required)

Get-access-files

Utility for synchronization of target host configuration files from AAA admin server (LDAP)

UC 3: Audit



UC 3: Audit II

Stream cipher allows immediate transfer

Stored blocks of streams are enciphered with chained cipher – allows integrity check and independence of blocks if some block of session has been removed

Stream contains timestamps of each input/output separated that allows better/custom heuristics implementation used to user issued command detection

When connection is temporary unavailable, sessions are locally cached (till enough cache space is available. If not, you win).

UC 3: Audit III

Search for stored session by

Date/time of start/end or session was active

Kerberos principal name

Process/Shell running

PID

User name

Command issued

Replay or pause stored part of session (or whole) in real or virtual time (faster or without idle times)

Auditor has a special access to full user input, binary dump of stored session possible

Customer4 – large czech bank

Call from sales manager:

They need to get a rid of ssh keys!

```
rm -fr ~/.ssh
find / -iname "id_rsa.*" -exec rm {};
```

UC 4 ssh keys bad bad bad

SSH keys are somewhere on the FS, unprotected. The access via ssh key does not show identity SSH Keys for users, but mostly for services (cron...) What they wanted:

- · Cheap, secure and fast solution
- Based on the UNIX system components
- · Windows access would be nice to have
- Easily integrated into the bank systems

UC 4 Kerberos?

Bank has already large Microsoft AD deployment

But the AD guys are ***s (not to mention we needed instance principals)

There is planned KRB5 architecture in other project, which ***s (not to be managed by IT sec guys, no user principals (PCIDSS limit))

We want brand NEW REALM!

UC 4 Kerberos??

Summary: in order to remove ssh keys we will:

- Start new KRB infrastructure (3servers, HA, backup, procedures, paper work,...)
- Name people responsible for this realm
- Change a lot of system scripts to obtain the tickets before calling ssh/scp

UC 4 – HP way

50+ Man Days project

- Testing, deployment and production environment (it is a bank, you know the drill)
- Rewriting scripts
- Training for the staff
- Lots of work, lots of fun but:
- Will it really increase the security?

SSH keys on the FS KRB keytab on the FS

Will it really increase the security?

The End

Thank you guys @147.228.0.0/16

No more killall -9 httpd on Digital UX fileserver